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ABSTRACT
This paper will examine the historical impetus for Vessel
Traffic System

(VTS) development in the United States.

Cost

benefit techniques utilized to establish the VTS requirements
are discussed and the data base upon which the analysis is
conducted is critiqued.

General Accounting Office criticism

of the Coast Guard's VTS development process are analyzed.
Finally VTS is examined as a single component

in the

improvement of port logistics, which must be arrayed against
other alternatives to make the most effective use of scarce
resources.
the

This final element is discussed with respect to

Federal

government's

attempt

to

allocatable costs in the form of user fees.

2

recover

clearly
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I.
A.

ORIGINS OF VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICES

INTRODUCTION
Of

the

critical

issues

in

maritime

transportation,

identified by the Maritime Transportation Research Board, of
the National Research Council

[Ref.

1],

the problems of

increased maritime accident statistics and congested,
obsolete port facilities are directly associated to the
motivation for the establishment of Vessel Traffic Services
(VTS) •
The purpose of VTS as implemented in the United States is
to reduce the probability of shipping accidents.

Despite

extensive efforts by the United States and other governments
and by private industry, maritime accidents of all types are
increasing.
physical

National and international emphasis has been on
solutions--design,

redundancy,

vessel

regulations

to

solutions.

construction,

operating

ensure

problem

equipment

requirements,

and

alleviation via

the

these

The failure of these solutions to reduce the

incidence of accidents has focused recent investigations on
the human element involved.

The studies [Ref. 2]

have found that, almost without exception,

[Ref. 3]

the proximate or

probable causes of collisions, rammings or groundings is some
form of human failure. There has been an inverse relationship
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between the known causes of accidents and the prevention
research conducted.

Most maritime accidents are due to human

inadequacy,

maritime

hardware.

while

Reversal

protracted.
additional

VTS,

of
in

set of eyes

research

this
this
for

is directed

disparate

interim,
the

trend

will

pilot,

toward

will

serve

as

synthesizing

be
an
the

information he requires, to allow him to more rapidly analyze
the si tua t ion. Addi t ionally, VTS will function as an enti ty
to scrutinize the harbor and forecast and prevent potentially
hazardous si tuations.
In many ports the channels and facilities are obsolete,
inadequate and unsafe to service modern ships.
designed

to

reduce

unit costs,

Modern ships

require deeper channels,

increased maneuver ing space and more sophisticated capi talintensive equipment handling facilities.

Larger capital

requirements, accelerated costs, parochial interests, and
concerns over the environmental effects of dredging have
operated counter to the port modernization needs.

Large

capital requirements and high interest rates have made it
difficult for ports to develop funding for the improvements.
Large, highly productive ships limit their calls to those
ports which can meet their draft requirements and desire
minimum turnaround time to reduce pressure on their operating
budgets.
congestion.

This

port

consolidation

causes

increased

VTS can mitigate the hazards induced by the

7

increased density and through efficient scheduling can limit
idle port time.
This commentary will examine the installation of VTS
systems in the United States.

The methodology utilized to

determine the ports which require VTS will be evaluated, as
will the data base upon which this methodology is founded.
Techniques for increasing the integrity of the data base, and
alternatives to conduct the needs analysis will be discussed.
Finally,

the political realities of the Coast Guard's VTS

implementation will be discussed,

identifying Congressional,

interagency and user interfaces.
B.

ORIGINS
Advances in ocean engineering sciences, which resulted

from World War II, saw an increased concern for the marine
environment domestically and
International Convention for
Sea by Oils in 1954.

internationally with the

Prevention of Pollution of

the

The 1957 International Geophysical Year

produced more involvement, but another event in 1957 captured
our national interest--the launching of Sputnik I.

Space

drew our attention away from the more pedestrian pursuits of
ocean research.

The national commitment to the manned space

program produced technological innovations in the decade of
the sixties at a pace unprecedented in man's history.
Marine industry,

known for relative tranquility, applied

spin-offs from space technology beginning a transition which
8

is still in progress.
construction,

new

expansion of

space

New materials were utilized for vessel
coatings
age

for

corrosion

technology

into maritime

produced new solutions to old problems.
growth

resulted

navigation,

in

improved

radar

and automation of

control,

the

trades

Computer industry

processing,

engineering

accurate

functions.

Computer aided design of vessels allowed the analysis of
structural and loading problems rapidly and precisely.

The

technological answers were presented to the maritime industry
at an accelerated pace, they were adapted and processed to
provide the cure expeditiously,

far

in advance of the

industry's ability to analyze the far-reaching ramifications
of the solutions.

The marine industry had technological

wealth but was unsure of the impact of the applications.
The capability existed to design a vessel explicitly
correct for any operating environment,

yet there existed no

environmental model on which to base the design. The vessel
master

was presented wi th

a

cornucopia of

navigational

instrumentation designed without understanding his reasoning
and decision processes.

These environmental

and

human

engineering deficiencies existed while the manning of these
improved vessels was reduced, despite the doubt that man's
critical functions were really duplicated.

The doubts were

hidden by the euphoria of technological successes in all
industries.
9

The closing of the Suez Canal in 1967 revolutionized the
concept of shipping.

Advanced design and material capability

coupled with the economies of scale to be realized from
longer ocean transits witnessed concepts of large expand from
30,000 dead weight tons in the early sixties to 200,000 dead
weight tons in the post-Suez crises era.

The United States'

domestic production of oil could not meet the demand.

In

1960, America imported about 1.7 million barrels of oil per
day; by 1970 this amount had doubled [Ref. 4].

Although the

carriers of oil got larger, our increased demand did not
appreciably reduce the flow of traffic in harbors and ports.
The prosperity of the late 1950's and early 1960's
precipitated the foundation of
concerned

with

their

individuals and groups

environment.

In

particular,

the

publication of a compilation of "New Yorker" articles titled
Silent Spring by Rachel Carson in 1963 produced a unifying
effect,

"the sort of

rallying point of

the movement to

protect the environment that the anti-slavery book Uncle
Tom's Cabin had been for the movement to abolish slavery in
the 1850's" [Ref. 5].

As environmental action groups built

support and lobbying efforts in the mid-1960's, they achieved
small successes in ammendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act

(1961, 1965, 1966), the Water Quality Act of

1965, and the Clean water Restoration Act of 1966.

Many

supporters and organizers of the ecological movement found a
10

more immediate issue which required their efforts,

the news

media had brought Vietnam into the American living room and
in late 1966, anti-war sentiments were beginning.
saw increased anti-war effort.
Vietnam War,

Despite this unrest,

in fUll color, continued.

the

Many organizers saw

no tangible results for their labors.
were dominant emotions.

1967-1968

Guilt and impotence

Those affected channeled their

energies into environmental matters to overcome the malaise.
Many politicians who could not afford to be liberal
concerning the war effort found it easy to be broadminded and
appease

on

matters

dealing

with

the

environment.

The

cathartic influence of achieving positive results redoubled
the efforts of these action groups and attracted additional
followers.

The

return

of

disenchanted

anti-war

demonstrators, coupled with recruitment efforts, resulted in
the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
and the confirmation of the power of the environmental lobby.
The environmental respi te dur ing the social upheaval of
the Vietnam protest era of the late 1960's did not permit the
incident on 18 March 1967 to go unnoticed.

The Tor rey

Canyon ran aground off the coast of Cornwall.

Thirty-five

million gallons of

heavy

black oil

were

spread over

a

hundred miles of British and French beaches. Thousands of
birds died, while the media covered the inept attempts to
limit,

burn or neutralize the oil.
11

The governments were

totally unprepared to handle the disaster.

Daily, ninety

thousand gallons of detergent were poured on the oil to aid
d Ls pe r s e me n t r

while

efforts

to

bomb the

ship and

floating oil with napalm were ineffective.

burn

It was later

discovered the toxicity of the detergent was far more harmful
to sea life than the oil [Ref. 6].
The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO)

convened

an

ramifications of

immediate

session

to

discuss

the

the Torrey Canyon disaster and laid

invaluable foundations for later international agreement, but
the process in such an arena is slow.
Domestically,

the late 1960's saw the ocean beginning to

be recognized as a vast resource, a fountain of food, energy,
and minerals to replace increasingly depleted land sources.
In light of the grave potential for destruction of the shared
resource,

maritime industry joined forces to limit the risk

of disaster. The Santa Barbara blowout from offshore oil
wells in 1969 dramatically pointed out the potential dangers
of oil in the marine environment, along with the inadequacy
of regulations to reduce the probability of disaster and laws
to deal with clean-up and liability.
Although tanker accidents at sea only account for 9.4
percent of ship-generated oil pollution and 3.3 percent of
all discharges

[Ref.

reflect the impact.

7],

the

figures

do

not

accurately

The image of the Torrey Canyon, or more

12

recently the Argo Merchant, breaking up in heavy weather,
permeating the ocean with a black scar, is, in the public
mind,

the

major

problem.

The

situation

is

further

exacerbated since accidents resulting from collisions or
groundings account for 56 percent of the accidental discharge
[Ref. 8] and are more likely to
within 5 miles)
areas.

[Ref.

9]

occur near shore (85 percent

resulting in damage to coastal

This damage is, of course, visible to the public.

More importantly, the 10 percent of the total oceanic area
represented by the coastal ocean and waters over

the

continental shelf and slope [Ref. 10] are highly productive
and represent the area of greatest biological activity.
Organic matter originating in the coastal ocean forms the
basis of the chain supporting all marine life.

This area is

considered the most productive on all the earth [Ref. 11].
In 1970, during this period of increased environmental
awareness,

the

united

States Coast Guard,

sensing

the

country's mood, sponsored the passage of two bills to promote
port and harbor safety and
collision and marine pollution.

reduce the probability of
These bills were the Vessel

Bridge-to-Bridge Radiotelephone Act and the Ports and
waterways Safety Act.

The thrust of both acts was to promote

navigational safety.

The Radiotelephone Act required a VHF

transceiver to be onboard vessels of a certain class upon
which

navigational

information

13

would

be

passed,

supplementing the Nautical Rules of the Road whistles signals
in the event of confusion.
Act

provided

discharge

the

of

The Ports and waterways Safety

Coast Guard

pollutants

in

the

power

harbors

by

to prevent
reducing

the

vessel

casualty risks through closer attention to vessel traffic
control, establishing rules for handling dangerous cargoes
and permitting inspection and enforcement measures ensuring
compliance.

Neither bill was passed in 1970 by the Ninety-

First Congress due to the lobbying efforts and testimony
presented by the marine

transportation industry.

These

opinions, while in substantial agreement with the safety
goals of both acts, disputed the language of the bills, which
they felt

lacked

specificity,

indiscriminate power.

granting

the

Coast Guard

The independence of the mariner was

threatened by the sweeping proposals, maritime traditions
must evolve slowly, or be pressured to be modified.
often

the

case,

legislation.

disaster

provided

On 18 January 1971,

the

As is

impetus

a collision

for

in San

Francisco Bay resulted in the spilling of 800,000 gallons of
heavy fuel oil.

The national exposure of the ecological and

wildlife damage was presented in brilliant color by National
Geographic

[Ref. 12].

The Magneson Act (PL679, 9 August 1950) authorizes the
President to make rules governing the movement,
and guarding of

vessels,

harbors,
14

inspection,

ports and waterfront

facilities in the United States upon determining that our
national security is endangered.

Executive Order (EO) 10173,

as amended by EO 11249 delegated this authority to the Coast
Guard.

The Coast Guard established the San Francisco Harbor

Advisory Radar as a test for evaluation purposes in 1970. 1
The

radar

system

participants, of

advised

ships,

who

were

traffic in the harbor.

voluntary

The Coast Guard

watch standers watched the accident develop and recorded the
radar images, yet were powerless to prevent it, since they
were unable to communicate with one of the vessels.
Those recorded photographs and the plight of helpless
oil-soaked birds battered by waves depicted
Geographic resulted in public indignation.
bearded,

long-haired

students,

in National

The images of

construction workers

and

senior citizens working alongside each other in a volunteer
effort to limit the damage,

illustrated the unanimity of

ecological purpose in a nation deeply divided by an unpopular
war.
The National Transportation Safety Board included in its
findings

that

a

traffic

separation

scheme,

the

use

of

radiotelephone to exchange passing information and/or a more

lAlthough the EO is manifestly linked with prevention of
sabotage and subversion activity, the Coast Guard carried
out a wide range of peacetime port and harbor safety
programs under the order.
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effective Harbor Advisory Radar system could have prevented
the collision.

It noted, "This potentially protecting public

radar system should no longer be placed in the position of
recording

the minute

powerless

to

prevent

stages of public disaster
it."

"The

underlying

while

and

significant inadequacy of the Harbor Advisory Radar

most

was the

lack of authority of the Coast Guard to regulate this traffic
which

prevented

a

publically

financed

facility

from

protecting the public against loss" [Ref. 13].
Between the findings of the Coast Guard on 21 April 1971
and the findings of the National Transportation Safety Board
on 28 July 1971,

the Congress approved the Vessel Bridge-to-

Bridge Radiotelephone Act and it became public law on 4
August 1971.

The Port and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA) was

legislated into law on 10 July 1972.
opposition was expressed.

Only token maritime

Congressional resolve was apparent

from the opening remarks in the PWSA hearing:
"The most recent collision occurred in January, 1971, in
the San Francisco Bay and involved the tankers, Arizona
Standard and the Oregon Standard, and brought into focus
the need for this port and harbor safety legislation ••.. Let
no one make the mistake that the mood of Congress is
anything but in the direction of this type of legislation"
[Ref. 14].
The

mood

of

the

1970's

was

firmly

established,

technological accomplishments were viewed with skepticism.
Social upheaval

shifted priorities from

technological

advances to environmental improvement and stability.
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Public

opinion

overwhelmingly

favored

responsible

development.

Safety concerns and environmental impacts are the hallmarks
of the decade.

Any alteration of the environment was wicked

and the courts were flooded with litigation.
mandate

for

awareness of

technological
the

advancement

ramifications

was

The 1960's

without

being

adequate

supplanted

by

concern for ecological stability.
In this constantly changing milieu, the Coast Guard was
charged wi th enacting the guidelines of the PWSA.

Arriving

at regUlations and systems to protect the harbor associated
marine environment, while not restricting the commerce of the
port,

was the intent.

This decade-long development will be

critiqued and evaluated.
The Coast Guard was positioned between maritime industry
battling for the continuance of the economic viability of
their livlihood and determined environmentalist.

The general

pUblic concern may best be characterized by the following:
"It is a curious situation that the
first arose, should now be threatened
one form of that life. But the sea,
sinister way, will continue to exist;
to life itself" [Ref. 15].
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sea, from which life
by the activities of
though changed in a
the threat is rather

II.
A.

VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICES DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION
This chapter will deal with the major issues encompassing

the analysis of

port improvements

through VTS.

Four

subdivisions have been identified:

B.

1.

Legislative directives.

2.

VTS definitions.

3.

Data required for VTS analysis.

4.

Cost benefit discussion.
LEGISLATIVE DIRECTIVES
1.

Port and Waterways Safety Act
The Congressional mandate in the form of the PWSA

provided

the Coast Guard

mechanisms by which
operation.

to

with a diverse set of

regulate more

structure

legal

in port

The act, among other things, authorized the Coast

Guard to:
Establish, operate and maintain vessel traffic services
and systems in congested waterways.
- Require vessels which operate in a traffic system to
carry or install electronics or other devices necessary.
- Control vessel traffic when conditions are hazardous or
congested, by specifying times of vessel movement,
establishing traffic routing schemes, establishing vessel
size and speed limitations and restricting vessel
operations to those who have particular operating
capabilities.
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Congress framed the Coast Guard's efforts to regulate
for the "safe and efficient conduct of marine commerce" by
requiring minimally, the following considerations:
- The scope and degree of the hazards.
- Vessel traffic characteristics, including traffic volume,
sizes and types of vessels, and the nature and level of
cargos.
- Geographic, climatic and other conditions of port and
waterway configurations.
- Environmental factors.
- Economic impact and effects.
- Local practices and customs.
Finally

the

Coast Guard was

to provide adequate

opportunity for consultation and comment to state and local
governments,
and

har bor

representatives of the maritime industry,
author i ties,

envi ronmental

groups

interested parties in the preparation of rules,

and

port
other

regulations

and standards.
Title Two of the bill is aimed at improving the
safety standards of vessels carrying hazardous cargos in bulk
and will not be analyzed.
C.

VTS DEFINITIONS
The legislative guidelines presented were extremely

broad and the development of the conceptual framework for the
implementation of the tenants was the responsibility of the
Coast Guard. The conceptualization, evaluation and design and

19

implementation of a system as integrated and complex as a
vessel

traffic

proportions.

control

system

was

a

task

of

major

Vessel traffic services are intended to assist

the vessel operator in safe navigation of his vessel where
traffic congestion presents an unacceptable risk of casualty.
While many features of the problem meet with widespread,
theoretical acceptance, each vessel traffic system must be
designed and tailored to satisfy the unique local geography,
traffic patterns and weather conditions of the harbor.
Despite the involved lobbying effort by the Coast Guard
for the PWSA [Ref. 16] [Ref. 17], their,experimentation and
early analysis to establish the feasibility for

VTS and

provide the theoretical and practical exper ience for future
implementation was minimal [Ref. 18].

While some specific

expertise was gained in the operation of the Harbor Advisory
Radar in San Francisco, the pre-PWSA period was one which
involved independent analysis targeted to specific limited
problems.

Early VTS's, shown in Table 1, were developed from

informal studies and limited statistical evaluations.
ear ly systems

These

were generally established without eliciting

the extensive experience of Western Euoropean ports which
have been operating VTS since 1948.
The

most

important

function

in

environment in which to investigate a

20

establishing
new

system

an

is to

Table 1
Basic Vessel Traffic Services in the
United States Before 1972 [Ref. 20]

Type

Port,Materway
St. Mary' s River

Operator

Vessel Movement Reportin:j
System (\MRS), TV

san Frarx:isco

\MRS, Radar, Experimental

us:n

New Orleans

Traffic Lights

Corps of Engineers
(a:>E)

cape Cod Canal

Traffic Lights, \MRS,
Radar, TV

COE

Chesapeake & Delaware
Canal

Traffic Lights, VMRS, TV

COE

St. Iawrence seaway

VMRS

St. Iawrence seaway
Developnent

Iblolulu

Signal '1'a.IJer

Harbor Master

I£lS Ange1es/Ia1g
Beach

Harbor Radar, Teletype set

IA/LB pilots

Baltimore

VHF-PM carmunications

Private

Portland, Oregon

VHF-PM carmunications

Private

Boston

VMRS

Private

identify the goals of the design and the purpose for which
VTS is intended.
The

Coast

Guard

contracted

the

Computer

Sciences

Corporation to assist them in planning VTS under the PWSA.
The study, which was completed in March, 1973 [Ref. 19], has
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formed the foundation upon which the majority of subsequent
coast Guard VTS analysis has been conducted.

The study was

concerned with three specific tasks:
1-

Development of a conceptual framework for VTS.

2.

Identification of the roles of the system participants.

3.

Development of an algorithm to determine the needs for
various levels of VTS.
A follow-on study completed in August, 1973 [Ref. 21]

utilized the algorithm to rank twenty-two major ports and
waterways

to

establish

relative

need

for

and

the

sophistication of the VTS.
A vessel traffic service may be defined as "an integrated
system encompassing the technologies,

equipment and people

employed to coordinate vessel movements in or approaching a
port or waterway"
definition

is

[Ref.

22].

generic

but

This official Coast Guard
specifically

avoids

some

controversial implementation issues which will be discussed
in the following chapter.

A more complete definition of VTS

would be:
"A vessel traffic system consists of an integrated plan
regulations, people, equipment and facilities for the
collection, analysis and dissemination of information to
assist and direct as needed, the maneuvering of vessels in
waters subject to congested vessel traffic" [Ref. 23].
This definition allows more flexibility to investigate
the

purpose of

the

service by:

examination of

a plan;

dissection of the data utilized for development, operation

22

and future modifications;

and finally,

focusing on the issue

of advice versus control.
The objectives of a VTS are:
1.

To reduce the probability of collisions and groundings.

2.

To expedite the flow of marine traffic.

The methodologies to achieve the above objectives find common
threads in studies throughout the world.
The VTS Issue Study Volume 2 described traffic management
components or methodologies as elements which could
utilized to build a VTS.

be

These elements consisted of, for

example, aids to navigation, port rules and regulations and
surveillance techniques utilizing radar or closed circuit
television.

The combinations of these elements could be

constructed to produce either a simplistic or advanced,
sophisticated
coordination

VTS.

were

Three

identified

advisory, to active management.

basic

levels

ranging

from

of

traffic

passive,

to

This three-tiered structure

could operate concurrently in the most modern system. Passive
systems,

involved traffic separation schemes,

regulations.

rules and

Advisory coordination involved the exchange of

information between vessels and a central station.

Active

management added the ability of the shore station to direct
vessel movements.
Other approaches to vessel traffic management are offered
by Dejean

[Ref.

24]

Fujii and Yamanouchi

23

[Ref.

251

and

Oraizi

[Ref.

classification

26].

Dejean

proposed

a

of:

passive

control,

which

three-level
involved

instructions or prohibitions before the vessel's entry or
departure from the port, based on traffic criteria, local
particulars and the vessel itself; active control, as
instructions or orders issued during port

navigation~

and

guidance or remote pilotage, as direct land based control
without the physical intervention of a pilot on the vessel's
bridge.
which

Fujii and Yamanouchi identify six management levels
evolve

the

usage

of

only communication,

communication with radar and television surveillance.
six levels are:

(1)

Information ae r vd ce r (2) Aids of

to
The

pilot~

(3) Signal control; (4) Vessel Management Reporting System
(VMRS)~

(5)

VMRS with signal

control~

and (6) VRMS requiring

signal control. Oraizi follows a pattern similar to the Coast
Guard's but adds a berthing level as another function of the
vessel's direct interface with the shore.
The VTS Issue Study Volume

2 fur ther subdi vides its

categories as illustrated in Table 2.

The levels represent

the system chosen, as that level of VTS capable of preventing
each mishap. The LR category is an additional level added by
the VTS Analysis of Port Needs study.

These seven categories

have established the hierarchy by which all Coast Guard
systems have evolved.
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Table 2
Classification of Vessel Management Systems
Designation

Deser iption

Type

Passive

Bridge-to-Bridge accidents jLrlged preventable
by Radiotelephone were canpiled separately to
adjust ear ly vrs data for the effects of the
Bridge-to-Bridge Radiotelephone Act of 1971.

Passive

Accidents which could be prevented by regulations including speed, limitations on passing,
one-way traffic considerations.

Passive

Traffic separation schemes to minimize close
encounters of vessels. None of the first
three levels require shore-based monitor ing •

Advisory

Vessel Movement Reporting System (VMRS).
Certain vessels are required to ccmnunicate
with a Vessel Traffic center (VIC) their navigational information, VIC plots the vessels
and advises vessels of traffic in their vicinity. Minimum reporting requirements are
specified.

Mvisory
or Active

Basic Surveillance includes radar
and/or Closed Circuit Television (CC'lV) of
selected portions of the port or waterway.
'lbe capability improves the VIC I s knowledge of
vessel presence and movement. Considered
necessary where b1irrl corners, bends or intersections exist, especially in restricted waterways.

Advisory
or Active

Advanced Surveillance includes more accurate
and canp1ex surveillance equipnent and may
have limited oanputer interface.

Active

Canputerized Mvanced Surveilance has full
oanputer interface and provide for the highest
reliability and accuracy in traffic management.
Designed for control in high densi ty, oanp1ex
traffic areas.
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D.

DATA REQUIRED FOR VTS ANALYSIS
Determination of the VTS needs of a port or waterway is

dependent upon the collection,
data.

After

analysis,

the problem def ini tion,

and application of
the most important

feature of correct analysis is accurate data.
The data bases abstracted for utilization in the VTS

1. and

Issue Study Volume

the VTS

Ana~sis

of Port Needs study

were the Coast Guard's Marine Vessel Casualty Reports (MCVR)
and the Army Corp of Engineer's Waterborne Commerce of the
United States.

Both of

available and both are
correlate

the

these data bases are

readily

required in order to develop and

effectiveness of

an algorithm

which will

establish the VTS requirements.
1.

Marine Vessel Casualty Report
Title 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations

(CFR)

charges the Coast Guard with the responsibility to collect
data on marine casualties.

Section 4.05-1 of the regulations

specif ies that the master, owner, agent or person in charge
of a vessel involved in a casualty is required to file a
report with the Coast Guard if any of the following criteria
are met:
1.

Accidental or intentional groundings.

2.

An occurrence affecting the seaworthiness of a vessel.

3.

Loss of life.
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4.

Injury causing a person to
period in excess of 72 hours.

be incapacitated for

a

5.

An occurrence not meeting any of the above criter~a but
resulting in property damage in excess of $25,000 .
Reports of marine casualties indicated above are made

on a Report of Vessel Casualty or Accident Form (CG-2692)
(See Appendix A). Upon the notification of an accident, the
Commandant of the Coast Guard or the District Commander will
order an investigation, per CFR 46 subpart 4.07-1 by the
local office of Marine Safety. The vessel casualty report
consists of (1) the endorsements of the District Commander
and the Marine Inspection Officer in ch ar qe r

(2) a letter

from the investigating officer detailing his findings; and

(3) the

CG-2692 casualty report form prepared by each vessel

operator

involved in the accident.

Copies of the above

report are forwarded to Coast Guard headquarters where they
are recorded on microfiche, and pertinent casualty data is
transcribed onto magnetic tape.
2.

Waterborne Commerce of the United States

---

The Army Corp of Engineers (COE) has jurisdiction
over

the

maintenance

waterways.
benefits

In order

which

of

clear

passage

along

to effectively weigh

would accrue

the costs

and

to a dredging project,

COE

2Th e $25,000 property damage criteria
1 January 1981. The previous limit
$1500.
Future studies will have
historical anomoly on property damage
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navigable

went into effect on
was established at
to acount for the
recorded.

collects data estimating two measures of traffic volume for a
diverse set of waterways:

vessel trips and cargo tonnage.

The COE data is available in annually published summaries and
in machine readable form, as a tape.
3.

Deficiency of the Data Base
Knowledge of casualty and

required as input data for

transit figures

an algorithm designed

to

are
(1)

determine the need for VTS and (2) determine the effect of
various levels of VTS.

Simply,

the probability of an

accident occurring is computed from the available data. Next,
the cost of those accidents are extracted from the data base
and an expected loss computed. Finally the effect that a
proposed

vessel

traffic

system

would

have

on

the

probabilities of accidents is determined and the expected
casualty losses recomputed [Ref. 27].
The above description illustrates the need to combine
and link the two data bases together.

Unfortunately, each

file has individual limitations. Additionally, problems with
their consolidation coalesce to produce an imperfect product.
a.

MCVR Data
The problems associated with the Coast Guard's

casualty data base are varied and enduring since the majority
of deficiencies which were identified in VTS Issue Study
Volume 3 have been found by more recent studies [Ref. 28],
[Ref. 29], and [Ref. 30].
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The

dynamics

of

the

casualty as

presently

reported are inadequate to conduct in depth analysis (i.e.,
speed and direction of ship or ships are not included).
The utilization and availability of

radar,

bridge-to- bridge communication and VTS are not included in
the

report.
Data contains significant coding errors and there

are no logic checks

to prevent obvious

incorrect

input

inaccuracies.
Data is not processed in a timely fashion.
delay

until

the

documentation

is

placed

on

The

tape

is

is entered by the date the file

is

approximately two years.
The data

received at headquarters and not the actual casualty date.
The

location data on

the

MCVR file

produces

insufficient specificity.
A Coast Guard study in 1971 [Ref. 31] suggested
that only about 30% of the reportable vessel casualties are
documented on CG-2692 forms. While the report logicallY
reasoned

that

a

higher

percentage

of

the

more

ser ious

accidents are reported due to the attention received,
nevertheless a significant portion of casualty statistics are
never recorded into the data base.

More recently the Lower

Mississippi River Safety Study found vast divergence between
the mishaps recorded in the New Orleans VTS logs and the
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information on the casualty file tape.

Approximately 31% of

the collisions and allisions 3 monitored by the VTS do not
appear on the casualty file.

The study did not conduct a

case by case analysis to ascertain which casualties were
reportable.

All groundings are required to be reported but

the study noted that 59 percent of the groundings logged were
not recorded on the casualty file tape.

A total of

335

casualties, consisting of 137 collisions and 198 groundings,
were not recorded on the casualty file tape. Assuming all
accidents were reportable,

a

total of

57 percent of

the

collisions and groundings that occurred went unreported.
A Coast Guard study in 1971 [Ref. 32] revealed an
additional inadequacy of the casualty data base, finding the
estimated damages recorded on the casualty reports were
approximately half of the actual damages. Additionally,

the

report alluded that property damage, pollution incidents and
injuries were also understated but no specific figures were
derived.

The cause of

this

inaccuracy lies

in early

estimates of casualty damage and no required or desired
feedback

to adjust

the

deficiency,

in addition

to

a

deliberate reduction to minimize the extent of the accident.

3Allision is defined as a vessel collision with a fixed
object such as wharves, docks, piers, bridges, submerged
objects, aids to navigation or oil rigs.
A collision
involves two vessels, an allision involves one.
VTS
Analysis of Port Needs study uses ramming in place-of
allision.
30

An

Operations/Research

Incorporated

study

[Ref. 33] in 1979 compared Coast Guard estimates of damage to
towboats with actual insurance repair costs. It found that
repair costs were underestimated by an average of 15 percent
during the fiscal years 1972-1976.
All of the Coast Guard data fails to account for
the costs associated with loss of

revenue,

workmen's

compensation and diversion from intended destination.
Statistics of Casualties for Fiscal Year 1978,
indicates

894 vessels involved in collisions with other

vessels while underway reported to the Coast Guard.
[Ref.

34]

collisions,

points out

that of

the

894

Potter

vessels

in

309

586 reported the primary cause as "fault on part

of other vessel or person".

This illustrates the bias and

inaccuracy extant in the present reporting/investigation
milieu.
b.

COE Data
The COE data,

with respect to location,

is

inconsistent with VTS locations.
COE data is computed by calendar year,

while

Coast Guard casualty data is compiled by fiscal year.
Recent comparisons have been conducted between
COE data and VTS transit logs [Ref. 35] [Ref. 36].

The data

files did not match since the COE is primarily concerned with
the movement of commerce and does not take into account berth
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shifts, barge transfers and other types of local movement in
the VTS area.

The different administrative requirement for

data

VTS

between

and COE produce

incompatability

information, time periods and geographical area.

in

Analysis of

VTS logs for the Houston VTS area found intraport movements,
solely within the port complex accounted for 50% of the VTS
transits,

interport movements within the VTS area accounted

for an additional 10%, neither of these transit figures are
reflected on COE information. Table 3 provides a VTS and COE
data comparison. The Houston study utilizes the COE data for
reasons of consistency with the Analysis of Port Needs study
and draws no further conclusions. The importance of this
information is how it effects the application of the
algorithm.

If

there were less activity

in a

harbor,

reduction in casualties would reflect the reduction in those
pressures on the por t

system

that might

enhance

hazard

potential. Therefore, if the activity were understated by
utilizing COE data as Table 3 illustrates, so too would be
the demonstrated effectiveness of VTS.
Table 3
VTS and COE Transit Data Comparison [Ref. 37]
YEAR
1975
1976
1977
1978

CODE DATA
--61,545
69,940
64,429
66,884
32

VTS DATA
----

%DIFF

72,766
74,819
83,132
88,547

18.2%
7.0%
29.0%
32.4%

4.

Analysis of Data
The significance of the descrepencies is that there

is

cast an aura of unreliability concerning the data bases

and their use results in grossly underestimated benefits of
VTS during the application of the algorithm (discussed in the
following

section).

A more subtle problem is engendered in the casual ty
reporting scheme of the Coast Guard. The stated purpose of
the casualty investigation is to promote safety, but the
mariners involved face possible civil penalties,
revocation

and/or

criminal

prosecution.

The

license

policy

of

combining safety and fault-finding investigations discourages
the mariner from submitting a CG 2692 form with candor. The
determination of the exact cause of a casualty may therefore
be uncertain.
In order that more accuracy in the casualty data base
be obtained it will be necessary to separate the faultfinding investigation from the safety inquiry and to protect
any information revealed on the Report of Vessel Casualty or
Accident Form and subsequent investigation statements
obtained from any use, other than marine safety.
Both

the

Air

investigative procedure.

Force

and

Navy

follow

a

dual

Air Force Regulations specify that

an Aircraft Accident Investigation will be for "the sole
purpose of

taking

corrective
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action

in

the

interest of

accident

prevention"

[Ref.

38].

A separate

Collateral

Investigation is held lito preserve available evidence for use
in claims,

litigation,

disciplinary action,

and adverse

administrative proceedings and for other purpose except for
safety and accident prevention purposes" [Ref. 39].
The Navy accomplishes similar separation as outlined
in Naval Aviation Safety Program OPNAVINST 3750.6M of 27
October

1980.

The

Mishap

Investigation

Report

Form

(Appendix B) serves to advise the witness to the purpose of
the

investigation,

the

immunity

confidentiality of the statement.

granted

and

the

These promises are made to

persuade witnesses to express their opinions and talk freely,
even though the information may be unsupported in fact, selfincriminating, embarrassing or cast blame upon a friend or
co-worker.
The objective of a safety investigation should be an
accurate

reconstruction

of

accomplished by an historian.

the

events,

as

would

be

Fault-finding inquiries, as do

trials, find interested witnesses polarizing, supporting
adversary positions which operate to distort, since those
concerned will only reveal that which supports their case.
Disinterested witnesses do not want to get involved due to
the inconvenience and the fear of harming someone.

In order

to break the chain of causation, and reveal the facts so to
avoid a similar accident, another channel must be pursued.
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The National Safety Council has found that witnesses would be
frank and candid with the promise of privilege.

Privilege is

the doctrine which holds the attorney/client relationship as
confidential.
To

avoid

investigation costs

and

to present the

impartial, highly influential opinion of an investigation
board,

attorneys have sought to supoena safety investigation

records and board members to support their litigation through
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 5USC552.
The principal issue is whether witness statements
given under

a promise of confidentiality to a Safety

Investigation Board are exempt from the mandatory disclosue
provisions of the FOIA.

In Cooper v. Department of the Navy,

558 F2d 274 (5th Cir. 1972) and Brockway v. Department of the
Air Force, 518 F2d 1184 (8th Cir. 1975), the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits held
~isclosure.

that

an FOIA Exemption

5 permits

non-

The Eighth Circuit found:

"If the statements are disclosed and the flow of
information to the Air Force safety investigation is
curtailed, there is the definite possibility that the
deliberative process of the Air Force will be hampered •••• n
[Ref. 40].
In Cooper,
Judgment 4•

the Fifth Circuit issued a Summary

Additional cases have supported

the above

precedent.
4A Summary Judgment is a court rUling stating there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the party is entitled
to prevail as a matter of law.
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'l'h e

problem

with law by precedent is that it is

subject to subsequent challenge. The Air Force and Navy have
felt secure in their position and pleased with the positive
gains in the accident prevention area due to the concept of
privilege.

On 21 September 1982, the Ninth Circuit in Weber

Aircraft Corp.,
history of
attorney

etc.

v,

exemption

work

U.S.

ruled

that the legislative

S only mentioned two privileges--

product and

the

predecisiona1 deliberations

executive

and Accident

privilege

Investigations

cannot be exempted from mandatory disclosure [Ref. 41].
Air

Force,

with

the

Navy's

for

concurrence,

is

The

seeking

legislation as a rider to the current Military Pay Bill to
free investigations from disclosureS.

Additionally,

the

Department of Defense has approved a legislative initiative
which they hope to have introduced as separate legislation to
the 98th Congress.
In order

to accurately and completely ascertain

causes and to determine corrective measures required to
promote safety at sea the powerful deterrent of prosecution
for candid responses must be removed.
investigation

should

specific exemption,

be

incorporated

by statute,

from

A separate safety
which

should seek

release

under

the

Freedom of Information Act.

SExemption three of the FOIA covers information
"specifically exempted from disclosure by statute."
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There

is an obvious need for

the Coast Guard to

improve the relevance of the data base through interagency

cooperation with the COE, updating cost figures after the
insurance claims

are

settled,

increasing

the

detail of

transcribed data and simple reduction of data entry errors.
An interesting fact is that the VTS system data mentioned is
manually compiled and processed.

Despite the fact that three

existing systems are computer aided and the microcomputer
market is unrestricted, the configurations do not include any
data collection capability. This shortcoming does not allow
the

rapid accurate gathering of statistical information

permitting future analysis [Ref. 42].
Finally,

regulations

indicate

one

additional

deficiency. Subpart 4.07-(C)of CFR 46 calls for the Coast
Guard to determine whether there is evidence that any Coast
Guard personnel or any representative or employee of any
other government agency caused or contributed to the cause of
the casualty. The Coast Guard has operational responsibility
for

traffic control systems,

licensing of operators and

approval of ship safety standards.

Therefore,

it

is

sometimes placed in the position of having to expose
deficiencies in its own operations while investigating marine
accidents.

Currently, an autonomous group, the National

Transportation Safety Board

(NTSB)

exists to perform an

independent investigation of major marine casualties as

37

defined in CFR 46 Subpart 4.40. The meeting of criteria for a
major casualty status is determined by the Coast Guard,

in a

preliminary investigation, as per CFR 46 Subpart 4.40-10, the
Coast Guard

then notifies the NTSB.

An agency such as NTSB could relieve the Coast Guard
of its self-policing burdens,

to allow findings outside the

jurisdiction of the Coast Guard.
E.

COST BENEFIT DISCUSSION
congestion is one of the problems the PWSA empowers the

Coast Guard to deal with.

When port approach congestion

becomes evident, multiple courses of action are available to
authorities.

Strategies include:

the

navigational aids and pilotage ae r v i ce s r

improvement of

deeper dredging or

wideningi the building of new berth facilities,
port surcharges,

increased

introduction or upgrade of vessel guidancei

scheduling or regulation schemes or better enforcementi or
some combination of

these solutions.

All of

the above

modifications must be compared with the "do nothing"
alternative which may prove the most attractive.
All

the

alternatives

will

ammend

the

economic

port

capacity and will have different returns based on capital
expenditure and operating costs over the project life.
Although the two VTS goals of safety and facilitation of
traffic were pronounced by the VTS Issue Study Volume

1,

it

recommended an algorithmic analysis which was based on the
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issue o f

safety.

Expediting

traffic was discarded as a

specific objective of VTS as a result of a survey of maritime
personnel.
safety

The survey indicated a wide acceptance of the

goal

facilitation

but
of

there

was

traffic,

skepticism

in fact

a

regarding

the

sizeable proportion

responded that a system may actually delay traffic.
An algorithm was developed to determine the current level
of safety in the harbor or waterway and how VTS would effect
this standard.
1.

Algorithm
Conceptualization of the problem to determine the VTS

requirements took on four stages as depicted in the VTS Issue
Study Volume 3:
1. Develop a model to define the potential or expected
losses for any port.
2.
Def i ne a re la t ionsh i p
reduction in potential losses.

be tween

VTS

leve Is

and

3. Develop a procedure to determine the level of VTS
required.
4.
Develop a procedure for comparing the needs for VTS
levels at individual ports, to obtain a relative ranking
among ports.
Boundaries of the problem space were delineated by viewing
accidents

as

preventable

or

not

preventable

by

VTS.

Unpreventable accidents were those involving maneuvering
difficulty, due to wind or currentJ mechanical failure, which
was sudden and unexpectedJ and personnel error which was
undetectable by the VTC.
39

Categories of preventable accidents are as follows:
1.

Collisions between two or more moving vessels.

2.
Collisions
at anchor.
3.

involving a moving vessel and a vessel

Rammings of fixed objects such as bridges.

4. Ramming of non-fixed
submerged objects.
5.

objects such as floating or

Groundings.
Casualty statistics were further delineated by the

type of damage, vessel type and the location as shown in the
categories of Table 4, which also indicates the MCVR tape
codes.
The potential hazard measurements are made with an
expected value formulation.

This can be expressed as hazard

"H" per one-way transit in a

through port Up" by a given

vessel of class Uk", involved in accident type "j" for each
damage class "i" (Refer to Table 4).
The product of
(accident type,

the

probabili ty of

vessel class,

each

acciden t

port) and the average loss

(type damage, accident type, vessel class, port) results in
the expected hazard (loss).
The probability is determined by the quotient of the
accident and transit totals, each in their categories.

The

average damage of each class is determined by the sum of the
damage of each category divided by the accidents of each
category.

National averages were computed for vessel and
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Table 4
Definition of Algorithm Categories

Symbol
i.

j.

k.

p.

*

Definition/Categories
Type of Damage or Loss
1. a. Vessel damage
b. Cargo damage
2. Property damage
3. Oil pollution (light/
medium/heavy)
4. Personnel casualties
a. Killed or missing
b. Injured or incapacitated

MCVR* Codes
Card
Character
Columns
Codes

67-70
71-74
75-78

($ Thousands)
($ Thousands)
($ Thousands)

21

1/2/3

51-58

(No. of persons)

59-66

(No. of persons)

Nature of Casualty or
Accident
32-33
1. COllisions: moving
vessels
2. Collisions: anchored/
moored, docking/undocking
3. Rammmings: fixed objects,
piers, bridges, etc.
4. Rammings: non-fixed
objects
5. Groundings
Vessel Type
1. Cargo ship
2. Tank ship
3. Freight barge
4. Tank barge
5. Tugs and towboats

1,2,3,6,7
4,5
9
8,10,11,12
21,22

13-14
13-14
13-14
13-14
13-14

02
17
03,28
18,29
09

45-47

Various

Location or Port

1. Various

Coast Guard Marine Vessel Casualty Reports Computer Format
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cargo loss; number of pollution incidents and deaths/injuries
for the years 1969-1971.

Property damage was considered port

unique and was left to the specific application to determine.
Probability calculations are employed so to be able
to utilize the laws of probability when combining accident
probabilities derived from historical data with predicted
future losses based on traffic projections.
Confidence limits are defined to evaluate the degree
of

uncertainty

calculated.

in

the

values of

An F distribution for

the

point estimates

the probability of an

accident is used, since it is defined as the ratio of two
random variables (accidents and transits) with assumed normal
distribution.

The student-t distribution was assumed for the

damage calculations.
A case-by-case analysis of each vessel casualty which
had occurred in a given port was the next procedure to be
conducted.

The analysis determined which accidents would

probably have been prevented if a VTS of a specified level
(Table

2)

had

been

in effect.

The

number

of

vessel

casualties in each category judged to be preventable can then
be used to calculate a revised set of accident probabilities.
Additionally,

the total losses which occurred

in the

accidents judged preventable indicate the expected savings
that would result from VTS,

representing half of a cost-

benefit assessment.

42

Application of this analysis is necessarily subjective and requires detailed examination of the causes and
circumstances of each casualty.

It should be applied by

personnel familiar with the port conditions and location,
utilizing the accident investigation.
established,

The specific criteria

for which VTS level prevents which type of

accident, was established in the VTS Analysis of Port Needs
study and is summarized in Appendix C. Appendix D contains
the

form

utilized

to assist

in the accident prevention

determination.
The comparison of ports occurs once the algorithm has
been applied, all accidents classified, and the level of VTS
calculated. Savings are presented as dollars of property,
vessel and cargo loss prevented; pollution incidents avoided;
and death/injuries prevented. The savings must be compared
with a cost curve for the system to be implemented. High
savings may be indicative of the requirement for a complex
multi-sectored system to prevent the accidents.

The optimal

level must be selected based on marginal analysis.
2.

Algorithm Application
The results of the research efforts in the algorithm

development of the VTS Issue Study Volume 3 was applied in
the VT~ Arr~l~~i~

£f

~£~~ ~e~~s

study in August,

1973.

Twenty-two ports and waterways were selected for analysis
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based on cargo tonnage, vessel transits and the number of
vessels involved in collisions, rammings and groundings.
The algorithm was adjusted, based on the inadequacies
of the data base. Annual vessel and cargo loss values
calculated were multiplied by two to account for unreported
accidents (discussion page 29).

An additional factor of two

was applied to adjust for underestimated damages (discussion
page

30).

The product of

twenty-two

ports,

which

the

study was

formed

the

the

ranking

basis

for

of
the

implementation of VTS in specific areas. The combined summary
and recommendations of VTS is presented in Table 5.
Based on the VTS Analysis of Port Needs results,

the

Coast Guard began producing planning proposals for the areas
of New York, New Orleans, and Houston/Galveston.

San

Francisco and Puget Sound VTS systems had previously been
established in 1972.
3.

General Accounting Office Critique
As the Coast Guard identified the requirements and

designed the VTS systems for the above ports, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) was performing an investigation of
VTS development.
Systems - What

This report entitled, "Vessel Traffic
is

Needed

to

Prevent

and

Reduce

Vessel

Accidents", was issued on 21 January 1975.
The GAO Report was a scathing criticism of the Coast
Guard's VTS development effort.
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The report begins by

Table 5
canbined SlItIIlary:

ConIX>Site Ranking of Ports and Waterways and Initial
VTS level selections

Ie1ative Ranking of Estimated
Annual Danages caused by C/RIG
Port or Waterway

~

CJl

Ib11ars

1
New York
2
New Orleans
3
lbuston/Ga1veston
sabine-Neches
(ICW 265-290)
4
5
Chesapeake Bay
ICW 80-99 (Morgan City) 9
ICW 107-129
(Cote Blanche)
13
11
Batal Ib.1ge
8
san Francisco
ICW 50-69 (Ib.Jna)
18
10
Chicago
7
Delaware River s Bay
6
Tanpa
16
Puget
U
lot>bi1e
14
Detroit River
ICW 155-179
0lermi11ion River)
19
15
St. IDuis
20
Ia1g Island SouOO
17
IA/IB
corpos Chr isti
21
22
Bostal

scum

Pollution

Deaths/
Injuries

1
2
3

2
1
3

4
8
5
6
9
17
12
18
7
10
20

VTS level
se1ections*

Ib11ars

Pollution

Deaths/
Injuries

Conposite
Ranking
Total

LoL22L23
2L2L3
~~

1
2
4

1
3
4

1
2
3

7
12
20

6
4
10

Lo2L2

6
9
3

5
9
8

6
4
7

31
39
42

U

L4
~
~Ls
~

22

14
5
15
13
9
11
8
17
7

11
16
14
21
15
19

18
21
19
16
20
22

13

Relative Ranking of EStimated
Annual !eduction due to VTS

LoL2~

¥2

~

~

~
Lo
Lo
Lo
Lo
Lo
Lo

La

Lo

5
7
11
8
10
17.5
17.5
12
17.5
17.5

2
7
10
6
11
17.5
17.5
12
17.5
17.5

5
9
8
10
11
17.5
17.5
12
17.5
17.5

43
57
59
69
73
75.5
79.5
80
94.5
95.5

17.5
17.5
17.5
17.5
17.5
17.5

17.5
17.5
17.5
17.5
17.5
17.5

17.5
17.5
17.5
17.5
17.5
17.5

100.5
104.5
105.5
106.5
108.5
115.5

'*Multiple selection indicates the area is sectorized, for exanp1e, New York has one Lo, two
LJ sectors.

~

and two

illustrating the collision and dollar loss figures which
demonstrate the severity of the problem.

The report quotes

Coast Guard officials and documents, then reveals how the
Coast Guard's behavior
references.

was

not

in

agreement

with

these

GAO felt the Coast Guard effort had been

misdirected toward more sophisticated VTS systems in few
ports rather than a simpler VTS in more ports [Ref. 43].
They accused the Coast Guard of

inaccurate cost/benefit

analysis [Ref. 44]. Additionally, they viewed that the Coast
Guard had been slow
regulations

and

in

those

implementing vessel movement

that

were enacted

direction and were inconsistent [Ref. 45].

lacked overall
The published

report indicated the Coast Guard's political defenses were
unguarded,
October,

after delaying their response twice,
1974 and

late November,

1974

[Ref.

in early
46]

the

Commandant's comments were issued in late February, 1975.
The Coast Guard successfully refuted the analysis of
the GAO, demonstrating the inaccurate utilization of the data
base,

by the GAO,

analysis.

for

both accident and cost benefit

The Coast Guard's analysis of the GAO figures for

accidents revealed they included MCVR data of American flag
vessels experiencing accidents in foreign waters over which
VTS could exercise no control [Ref. 47].

They proved the

GAO's cost analysis and discipleship for increased VMRS level
VTS did not accurately reflect life-cycle costs, since it did
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not include extensive manpower costs. The Coast Guard stated
that the division between sophisticated and basic systems was
not

with

the

inclusion of

surveillence devices,

as GAO

argued, but with the implementation of a manned VTC which
dramatically increased life-cycle costs [Ref. 48].

The Coast

Guard concurred in GAO's analysis with regard to regulation,
countering with the fact that the complexity of the task
requires that regulations receive careful scrutiny. They
pointed to several examples of established regulations,
stating the "promulgation of regulations under the Act [PWSA]
has not been rapid, but the progress has been steady" [Ref.
49].

The

Coast

Guard

failed

to

illustrate

that

an

algorithmic analysis is based on the prediction of increased
congestion followed by increased probability of accident,
which can be a powerful influence on increasing the VTS level
in a port or waterway.
The
organization,

GAO report

illustrates

the

nature

one which makes simplistic arguments,

of

the

lacking

depth or factual analysis, but has intuitive Congressional
appeal

(in this

instance spread the VTS wealth

to many

ports). GAO is a master of impact, presenting easy to read
graphs,

star tl ing pictures,

in double-spaced,

orchestrated, subtitled construction.

carefully

A GAO report generally

is on target in that the program is not being optimized, but
they often overstate their case.
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The organization's purpose

is satisfied if they coerce the agency into are-evaluation
of their behavior and criterion for the initial analysis.
While the Coast Guard was successful in defending the VTS
program, the headlines were generated by the original GAO
report

and

the

Coast Guard's

Congressional support

was

injured. The Coast Guard's internal confidence was bruised
and a careful and complete defense did not avoid long-term
deleterious effects to the VTS project.

They repeatedly

testified to Congress on the inacuracies of the GAO report,
twice at length [Ref. 50]
their

damaged

confirmed

in

[Ref. 51], in an attempt to restore

reputation.

This diminished presence

that Congress

authorized

funds

for

is
the

installation of surveillance radar at New Orlean's VTS, but
stipulated

the

funds

not

be

used

until

the Coast Guard

completed a comprehensive study of the communications and
electronic surveillance needs of the entire New Orleans area
[Ref. 52].

This development had a profound effect on VTS New

Orleans and will be discussed in Chapter III.
The self-assured, bold statements such as:
"The Coast Guard believes it alone possesses sufficient
expertise in this new discipline [VTS] to determine the
minimum level required in each port or area" [Ref. 53].
"The Coast Guard intends to
implement the vessel traffic
system program on the basis of cost/benefit considerations
and national needs" [Ref. 54].
are not based on confidence,

but indicate the defensive

posture of the Coast Guard. The GAO challenge was the
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prologue for a general decline in VTS effort.
programs continued,

While the

and were administered competently,

they

were without the earlier intense sponsorship.
4.

Algorithm Examination
The GAO chose not

to censure

the weakness and

application of the algorithm as presented in the two studies;
those flaws will be elaborated upon.
The algori thm was developed to exploi t
data bases.

the existing

The advantage of having pre-existing data bases

is offset if the content is inaccurate (Section 03).

The

most striking weakness of the application in the VTS Analysis
of Port Needs study is the reliance on correction factors to
attenuate the inadequacy of the data. While the analysis,
though subjecti v e ,

was proper and subsequently has been

documented by VTS log data, the rigorousness is subjective
and not statistically stable.

The selection of a multiple of

four exposed the Coast Guard to accusations that such a
procedure would allow an analyst to come to any conclusion by
simply deciding what the outcome should be and choosing the
data adjustment factor accordingly.

In fact,

the Ad Hoc

Committee for Ports and Waterways in New Orleans made a
similar indictment [Ref. 55].
The inaccuracy of the data discussed in the previous
section, coupled with the adjustment factor superimposed over
a small sample size gathered over three years, makes the
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outcome suspect. The study failed to follow an adage of Mark
Twain's:

"Get your facts first,

then you can distort them as

much as you please."
Although

subsequent

studies

have

performed

sensitivity analysis on the variables [Ref. 56] to illustrate
the effects of the coefficients, no such investigation was
performed in the 1973 study.
The algorithm does not attempt to handle the results
of a catastrophic accident since the data is aggregated. The
danger of this approach is that the average accident will not
be debilitating; the marine disaster, however, will have farreaching effects.
producing

an

accident in a

The problem is two-sided, aggregated data

average

will

serve

to hide

large data base or a

significant

large accident will

overstate the evaluation in a small sample.
tend to distort the result.

a

Either case will

The disaster is not an outlier

causing perturbations in the analysis but a genuine part of
the population which must be handled.

Although the base

would be small it would be preferrable to handle the
catastrophic accidents in a separate analysis, determine the
VTS needs to avoid,

and decide if the cost benefit ratio

exists to justify the more complex system. Alternatively, the
reduced probability of the disaster may allow the build up of
reserves in savings with the lesser system, so a large loss
can be managed. Overlayed on this analysis and not taken into
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account,

is the fact that each accident has the potential to

assume cataclysmic proportions A reduction in this potential
is not accounted for in the model [Ref. 57].
The costs of a vessel, with respect to lost operating
revenue due
model.

to an accident,

is not accounted for

in the

With vessel costs between twenty-five and forty

thousand dollars per day [Ref. 58] [Ref. 59], this sum could
easily be greater than estimated repair costs.
The algorithm does not allow for the benefits of the
facilitation of commerce. VTS could permit a harbor to remain
active despite retarded visibili ty,

thereby avoiding vessel

demurrage and enabling full harbor employment.
The benefits of the algorithm are expressed in the
losses avoided by:
1.

Damage to the vessel and its cargo.

2.

Property damage.

3.

Pollution damage.

4.

Death/injury avoidance.

Comparisons

among

ports

can

be

accomplished

by

contrasting the factors; this can become subjective (how does
one equate property damage to pollution incidents).

The

conversion of the factors to dollars via an application of
weighting factors is also subject to potential controversy.
For example, there has always been a dispute about how to
establish a

dollar

value for
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a death or serious injury.

Arraying the factors separately and ranking each casualty
type separately appears the best way to arrive at the result
with the least dispute (Table 5).
A major difficulty with this algorithm or any model
which is developed based on past data is that there is no
surety that the future will reflect the past. Any changes in
conditions which might effect marine casualties will lessen
the effectiveness of the model unless they are taken into
consideration.

Increases in commerce, changes in the variety

of vessels and more reliable operators are all factors of the
port analysis. 6

The fear of Very Large Crude Carrier

(VLCC)

transits through American ports, might produce a factor which
would operate to increase the VTS level;

more proficient

operators, more modern navigation equipment and decreased
traffic density due to fewer
of

effectiveness.

Environmental pressures which caused dredging

resulted

American ports.

in

these

therefore

might aid the

suppression

delays

accidents

transits,

fears

never

assisting

materializing

VTS

in

The reopening of the Suez Canal, the oil

glut, depressed shipping rates,

inflated ship-building costs,

high ship operating costs, served to limit VLCC expansion.

6 Th e hysteria which followed Noel Mostert's "New Yorker"
articles and subsequent, well written but highly subjective
book Supership, had unique widespread effects on port
development.
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Therefore, a prediction which reckoned on a safety margin for
VLCC's would be incorrect.
The advantage of using past data, particularly if
adjusted for known or predicted modifications, is that it
allows

the

port hazard and

weather

automatically included in the model,

conditions

to be

since these factors

clearly impacted on the casualty statistics. The approach
avoids the need to develop possibly highly variable judgments
about

the

relative

risks

various

vessels

encounter

in

different ports under current conditions [Ref. 60].
Ideally, if the data base is large enough, a casualty
predictor should be able to be developed for each port based
on the data.

The Houston/Galveston VTS Casualty Analysis

study produced just such a predictor, simply the product of
the

number

of

transits

and

the commerce in tons.

A

correlation factor of .98 resulted and least squares line
produced a formula for casualties [Ref. 61]. Although the
limited data has not been evaluated in different ports, it
verifies what is naturally assumed:
to amount of commerce and

casualties are related

transits.

This type of

tool,

available from the algorithm can be utilized to increase or
decrease the level of VTS, or the port facilities, based on
their effect on the predicted casualties.
The probabilistic

and

statistical data

which

is

generated, all must be overlaid onto the political structure
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which may yield entirely unexpected answers.

This structure

will be examined in Chapter III.
5.

Simulation
The VTS

~~al~i~

of Needs study produced a list of

ports and the recommended level of VTS to avoid preventable
accidents.
data.

The next phase requires current, port unique

This data is gathered via a specially equipped Coast

Guard trailer, with the capability to record radio channel
communications and radar images [Ref. 62].
then analyzed to produce:

This raw data is

1) vessel density at various

locations; 2) identification of port routes; 3) compilation
of vessel close encounters;

4) vessel speed; and 5) radio

channel loading and efficiency [Ref. 63].

The data, gathered

over a period of several days, is then manually manipulated
to produce the optimum location for surveillance and radio
equipment,

and confirm the VTS level and sector assignments

arrived at in the VTS Analysis of Needs study.

The problem

with this approach to system design is that the analysis is
based on limited observed data which is subject to distortion
in the extraction of the above variables.

Additionally, the

manual manipulation of the data is exposed to subjectivity
based on the degree of experience and familiarity with the
port, embodied in the analyst.
To

provide

an

concerning equipment,

improved

caliber

of

sight selection and a
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precision
strictly

quantifiable accident reduction percentage attributable to
VTS, simulation modeling should be utilized as a tool.
Proper

simulation
of

a

involves the abstraction of

essential

components

problem

to

provide

accurate

portrayal,

while eliminating unnecessary complexities which

obscure the facets to be observed. This synthesis is highly
complex, involving initially the extraction of the correct
problem to be analyzed, and the selection of the details to
be targeted for elimination or inclusion in the model.

In a

simulation effort the purpose and methodology must be firmly
established; if this is not the case, our input techniques
will create a trend in a truly random pattern. Additionally,
the level of model accuracy is important and its sensitivity
to varying coefficients must be understood.

The accuracy and

completeness required is determined by the decision to be
made,

generally the slicker the simulation,

incapable

it

will

be

in handling

the more

exceptions.

A VTS

simulation model must be designed to evaluate traffic flow,
VTS capacity, safety and capacity of a specific port, without
overemphasis

on

less

important

factors.

Obviously

the

simulation model must be designed with sufficient capacity
and be easily modifiable to conform to a variety of port
unique characteristics while not effecting the model's basic
operation.
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The analysis of these concepts in the design produce
a clearer concept of the interrelating effects of a VTS,
harbor, vessels, and the environment.

There are definite

advantages to following a simulation approach. First, the
synthesis and abstraction produce the important variables to
be considered, without sacrificing accuracy.
should

abstract

character istics,

the

major

variables

harbor character istics,

A VTS model
of:

vessel

vessel routes,

and

rules of engagement scenarios (following the rules of the
road).

Variables such as vessel wind loading, bank suction,

or squat are not necessary since traffic behavior, and not
detailed, individual vessel response, is the intent of the
model.
The ability to repeat the analysis is a second
advantage.
conditions;
effects

Data

can

be

generated

under

controlled

small modifications can be applied and the

examined.

The

comparison

of

nearly

identical

situations can result in an optimal (within model limits)
solution.
The third advantage is flexibility. Real world
situations can be simulated,

upon which can be layered a

variety of traffic management techniques.
Simulation models in general have two limitations
which must be understood.

If the model is too large and lor

the computer is too small, the simulation will not replicate
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the actual operation but respond slower.

If the model gets

too complicated, representing each detail of vessel operation
it is likely not to produce an accurate depiction.
The most important limitation is in the input data
and design of the model, an improper or unvalidated model may
produce irrelevant or inappropriate data.
The Coast Guard experience with VTS simulation was
initiated with an attempt to modify aircraft simulations to
reflect vessel characteristics

[Ref.

64].

The analysis

produced error since the scope of the study was too narrow.
The study was to identify aircraft simulation models the
Coast Guard could use with minimal change and get good
results.

The conclusions of

this

study found

that any

conversion would only result in a temporary solution. Coast
Guard efforts, therefore,

were applied to manual analysis.

There was a failure to conceptualize appropriate
aircraft models and abstract useful portions because of the
view that there was a large difference between the

two

applications, the aircraft model being complicated and the
VTS model more simplistic.
model resulted in a delay

Failure to see parallels in the
in VTS simulation.

The model

differences that aircraft operate in three dimensions,
higher

rate

rapidly,
control.

of

speed,

therefore

need

at a

information more

can be abstracted as an exact match to vessel
The abstraction is possible due to the vast
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difference in controlability between aircraft and ships.
Boeing 747 weighs 300 tons,

A

has 200,000 horsepower and a

variety of control surfaces to effect a maneuver.

A VLCC of

300,000 tons has approximately 40,000 shaft horsepower and
minimum control capability.

The aircraft is 1000 times

lighter and has six times the horsepower.

The ship needs

information in a timely fashion, just as the aircraft does,
since it must anticipate and begin
The

ship

needs

to

have

the

its maneuvering early.

capability to detect small

perturbations in its position since its reaction is so slow,
early analysis is required to permit timely response.
A simulation model was contracted for in 1978, and
finalized

in July 1981

[Ref.

65].

The model appears

excellent and validated well in the design tests, an analysis
is

beyond

the

scope of

this

study.

The

lack of VTS

development, briefly mentioned in the GAO section, and the
current moritorium on VTS [Ref. 66]

(discussed in Chapter

III) has not allowed the model to be fully tested.
6.

Conclusions
The primary fuel for a cost benefit study, or needs

investigation,

which might produce an obvious,

implement, overlooked solution is accurate,

easy

to

timely, precise

data.
With a

small amount of data,

imaginative thinking is required.

58

a great deal of

The vital ingredient to

this process is viewing the problem remotely, to avoid a
myopic view, most often the
significantly

simpler.

resulting design will be

This also avoids

the danger

of

becoming too involved in technique while disregarding the
purpose of the analysis.
The GAO in directing their analysis on the degree of
hardware involved, vice the data analyzed, portrayed a common
American malady.

Hardware studies and applications attract

more attention than traffic data gathering or analysis.
Research concerning equipment is easier,
are more concrete,

therefore

the

in that the results

investigation

exciting and accumulates more recognition.

is more

The nation is

enamored with technological solutions and has a fascination
with gadgets which results in research conducted with little
thought to incorporating
Therefore

the

it into the operating systems.

technolog ical

intent,

however

excellent,

doesn't blend into the application with harmony but rather
appears included as if an afterthought.

The lack of effort

in

obtain

data

gathering

understan~ing

since

that

and

analysis

to

a

better

of underlying traffic theory is an enigma,

should

be

the

basis

development decisions are made.

upon

which

hardware

with complete data,

pragmatic solutions to problems can be pursued,

limiting the

problems of disjointed research, which often provides more
areas for investigation than clarifications.
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The multiple

factors effecting the outcome of reliable modeling make it
imperative to get accurate, complete data.
The Coast Guard's defense of utilizing closed circuit
television as a VTS surveillance technique,
above conjecture.

illustrates the

The justification for the ill-fitting,

useful, but minimally cost effective fascination was shallow
and unsubstantiated [Ref. 67].
The Coast Guard failed to step back and demonstrate
the validity of the algorithmic model; instead they attacked
the GAO analysis.

This failure was probably prompted by the

fear that the data base and statistical adjustments would be
challenged.

They chose instead to go on the offense vice

defend the algorithm.
Cost-benefit
excellent.

The

analysis

approach

with

is

the

algorithm

simplistic,

is

readily

understandable, without complex mathematics, so congressional
investors can be easily convinced of the validity.
The

algorithm

is

a

crude

approximation

which

demonstrated an order of magnitude improvement in safety as
the result of VTS investment.

It is expandable,

in that

simple simulation techniques can easily be embroidered on the
model to magnify the results.

The algorithm fulfils the

Coast Guard's objectives as stated in a 1971 position paper,
"Vessel

Traffic

Services

and

Congressional testimony:
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Systems"

and

echoed

in

" •.. to select the minimum level of services and systems
required in each port or area to minimize the hazards to
vessels, fixed objects and the environment wi th the least
public cost, disruptions of marine traffic and economic
impact. II
An
development.

interesting contrast exists in foreign VTS
The concept of foreign VTS's is to maximize the

efficiency of the docks, coordinate pilotage, and promote
optimum vessel throughput by the careful management of vessel
movements.

This approach emphasizes economics and varies

from the more narrowly defined objective of increased vessel
safety fostered

in the United States.

European port

authorities install and operate VTS to make the port more
attractive to maritime trade by the facilitation of traffic
movement.

Safety is considered a subset of the orderly

movement of traffic.

This view is motivated by the keen

competition for trade,

between ports,

to allow products and

raw materials to reach the European interior.

With vessel

costs astronomical, a swifter turnaround in a port will be an
inviting prospect.

Therefore government and private

investment has been aimed at improved facilities to ensure an
increased profit and success against neighboring countries so
as to improve balance of payment margins.
To increase throughput you generally need a higher
level of VTS than would be required to maximize safety. This
higher level would increase the efficacy of the port with
respect to its neighbors and the question that is evoked is
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whether VTS should serve the entrepreneural ambitions of the
port. This question intimately weds economic issues with
politics.
Chapter

The political implications will be examined in

III.
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III.
The

appeal

POLITICAL/IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
and exigency

for

VTS

is

pe r s u a s i ve r

the

combination of equipment and people, both shoreside and at
sea, and regulations designed to make maritime transportation
in

an

area

safer.

Marine

traffic

management,

space

management with which we have engendered extensive experience
on the highways, airways and railways, is a familiar concept.
Intuitively, shore based authorities can have a more complete
view of the overall traffic problem than any individual ship.
Their surveillance equipment can be better. They can gather
more sources of information and more quickly integrate the
results. They have enforcement power for traffic rules and
regulations and can orchestrate one way movement and queuing
systems.
While there might be some dispute as to the degree of
safety enhancement achieved by VTS schemes, Congressional
testimony received throughout the country from a complete
representation of marine interests, indicates general support
for the above statement.
The striking nature of the analysis that determined where
to install VTS was tha t the benef i ts were not compared to the
advantages returned from alternatives,

which would increase

the safety (reduce the congestion) of the port or waterway.
Rather, the analysis simply decided the VTS level, if any,
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that would produce a favorable benefit to cost ratio in a
marginal optimization.

Since 1977, on the basis of findings

of cost-effectiveness analyses,

the Coast Guard has not

proposed to add new VTS installations or to make major system
upgrades to existing systems [Ref. 68].

During this same

time period the ports of Europe and Asia have vastly expanded
traffic management systems
Additionally,

in scope and sophistication.

more ports have initiated VTS based on the

philosophy that traffic would be facilitated.
Evidently the safety justification for VTS development
has reached its limit, however, the increments to be accrued
from

such investment have not been fully realized.

rejection of

The

traffic facilitation as a goal has a more

fundamental reason than the

uncertainty of mariners,

expressed in the VTS Issue Study, Volume

l,i

it is derived

from the Constitution.
Federal policy with respect to port development, has been
one of nondiscrimination, the origins are found in Article 1,
Section 9 of the Constitution which provides, in part, that:
"No preference shall be given by any regulation, of
commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of
another ••• "
The policy of nondiscrimination has promoted a tension
which has characterized American society from its beginning,
egalitarianism versus elitism.

There is a pressure for "no

preference" to assure that funds appropriated are distributed
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geographically as widely as possible, versus support for the
best or most economically correct solution from a regional or
national viewpoint.

Current economic constrictures have

indicated that the capital intensive nature of port and
harbor development will not permit the support of ineffective
or second best ports in the misguided interest of political
egalitarianism.
Background for formulation of the constitutional policy
noted above was centered on a need to develop a long,
relatively undeveloped coastline into that of a maritime
power.

Inefficient land transportation avenues fostered the

necessity to develop all of the natural ports along the
seaboard in order to most efficiently receive and distribute
products from and to the hinterland.

Basic mistrust of

centralized government left port and harbor planning and
development at the state and local level.

Aid, provided by

the Army Corps of Engineers (COE) in the form of dredging and
port and harbor technical assistance, represents the largest
federal support.

While a VTS developed to promote public

safety and preserve environmental quality was recognized as
required, one aimed at increased traffic flow would represent
preferential treatment.
geographic uniformity,

The emphasis is to maintain

so as not to provide one state or

region with an economic advantage.
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This

fragmented

structure,

based

upon

limiting

discrimination, historically presented no problem in port
development.

Although some excess capacity resulted, the

costs were not very large and growing trade generally matched
the port expansion.

Recent advances in shipping technology

and environmental concerns impacted on this constitutional
precedent,

producing

the

imperatives

which

require

the

establishment of a regional or national policy focusing on
port development.
Traditional break-bulk cargo vessels, of relatively small
size,

allowed the development of a large number of port

facilities,

each serving its own economic area,

each harbor

having the depth to service most commercial carriers.
absence

of

the

environmental

concerns

disposal and coastal zone management,

of

dredge

The
spoil

permitted channel

dredging and greater port land usage to expand in proportion
with the slow growth in vessel size.

This combination of

simple shipping technology and the absence of environmental
regulations kept port development cost low [Ref. 69].
Rapid technological advances, with the introduction of
container ization and intermodal services,

have dramatically

increased the capital intensity of port facilities required
to accommodate the movement of cargo.
these vessels,

The larger size of

along with the increased size of dry and

liquid bulk carriers, to reduce the unit cost of shipment,
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has

required deeper

harbors

and channels.

The cost of

development increased further due to heightened environmental

awareness concerning the disposal of dredge spoils (from 6.5%
to 1519%)

[Ref. 70].

Additionally the length of the approval

process has grown enormously during which capital investment
is stagnant, unable to adequately serve the intended ship
population.

The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972

encouraged state and local governments to limit shoreside
development with a concomitant dramatic increase in land
acquisition costs for port expansion.
Decisions on

where to install VTS cannot be made

independently, but must be examined in the context of total
port development.

An installed,

overloaded VTS may be

adequate if additional berths are available, an option which
may be more cost-effective than enlarging the VTS.

The

elements of port operations must be examined together to
permit optimization and further,
regionally

to

distinguish

how

they must be examined

best

to

allocate

scarce

resources.
Where

to

invest

in

increased

VTS

parallels

the

controversy concerning which harbors and waterways to dredge.
Historically, navigation channels in American ports have been
the responsibility of the Federal Government. Dredging and
subsequent maintenance has been conducted by COE using funds
appropriated by Congress.

As a consequence,
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the entire port

structure has been developed on the assumption of continued
federal responsibility.

Ports have been built, rates set,

expansion plans drawn based on the above involvement, channel
construction and maintenance have not been included in the
cost structure.
COE cost benefit analysis only investigates if the local
benefits outweigh the dredging costs,

never noting if a

competing

would

port

or

channel

facility

be

a

more

appropriate investment.
A national port development policy to decide how best to
allocate resources for

dredging,

VTS development and

increased capital investment for shore infrastructures is
required, but clearly outside the limits of the Constitution.
The current Administration's solution to this dilemma is to
cut government expenditure in the area of dredging,
the ports to assume the costs.

forcing

The policy is consistent with

the recovery of clearly allocatable costs from users.
fees

is a seventies concept

[Ref.

User

71] given increased

intensity under the banner of "New Federalism."

In testimony

before the Senate Sub-Committee on water Resources,

OMB

Director David Stockman voiced the administration's position:
"I believe that not requiring users to bear the full cost
of their activities encourages overdeve1opment of high cost
ports.... Instituting a market test of the value of port
maintenance and development will eliminate dredging that
users are unwilling to pay for and establish quickly, where
dredging is economically viable" [Ref. 72].
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Since this port expense is unplanned the effects on port
authorities and state and local governments is profound.
The framing of port policy via a market mechanism saw
twelve separate pieces of legislation debated in the NinetySeventh Congress with no compromise emerging [Ref. 73] COE is
currently developing a new legislative iniative involving
regional coordination and partnership with less than full
federal cost recovery [Ref.

74].

The policy of cost recovery is also the SUbject of review
with respect to VTS.

The recommendations in the coast Guard

Roles and Missions Report were as follows:
1.
For those ports where a Vessel Traffic Service
could be operated by a State or local organization and that
organization is willing to assume the responsibility, the
operations should be turned over to the local authorities
under general supervision by the Coast Guard. Any existing
VTS which a qualified State or local authority is not
willing to take over should be closed, unless the Secretary
determines that compelling national needs require its
continuation.

2. For VTS's operated by the Federal Government, the
costs of operating such systems should be recovered from
the primary beneficiaries of the service through an
appropriate user charge policy.
An internal Coast Guard review, as required by the Roles and
Mission Study, is currently being conducted to determine the
need for VTS.
Authentic cost benef it can only be achieved by weighing
all port development alternatives against each other.

Under

the current fragmented control structure this is not
possible.

The establishment of a lead agency to coordinate a
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licensing procedure for all options including VTS, through
which port or local authorities could weigh the alternatives
is required.

The Coast Guard, or bureau directly concerned,

could act as a regulatory agency to ensure uniformity, so to
facilitate foreign and interstate commerce.
In the long run,

traffic regulation and the operation of

priority rules should attempt to reduce the cost of ship time
in port and maximize the difference between the costs of
regulation and the benefits of reduced delay with the system.
Similarly, it will be worth investing in wider or deeper
approach channels,

if the benefits of the reduction of delay

exceed the extra capi tal costs.
above

Benef its for either of the

schemes would not be realized

if a docking queue

existed, so the total structure of the port must be viewed in
allocating investment dollars.
The problem with facilitation analysis of VTS is that the
assessment of the expected
available data.
---------

f~~~£~

yield is made from

The lack of experience with similar

investments make reasonable assessments difficult.

Unique

investment considerations always produce results which are
considerably less reliable.
The lack of firm data makes the analysis difficult.
broad appraisals

can

be

made

from

the

limited

data

Yet
to

indicate and quantify the definite positive gains from VTS
installation.

Such an evaluation was determined for
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the

Houston/Galveston VTS [Ref. 75].

A conservative estimate of

50,000 transits was assumed (conservative based on COE or VTS
estimates).
yielding

An average transit time of two hours was assumed

100,000 transit hours per year.

VTS statistics

indicate a three percent reduction in transit time, which
results in 3,000 transit hours per year savings.

If

an

average vessel cost is $10,000 per day, the yearly savings
due to VTS presence is $1,250,000.

The reduction in transit

times must be formally quantified via

a program which

automatically analyzes origin, and destination points and
transit time and arrays this data into a statistical base.
The cost-benefit justification, while difficult, when summed
with the hazard reduction figures, can produce a clear gain.
The ability to move in reduced visibility also offers areas
for additional revenue capture.
The willingness of local and state authorities to assume
VTS operations will be a direct outgrowth of the confidence
local mariners display in the service, demonstrated by their
participation.

Despite difficulties in arriving at a cost-

benefit ratio vocal support from local industry will override
strict cost-benefit considerations.
The PWSA was very specific in its provisions to ensure
the Coast Guard consulted all facets of the marine industry
when establishing the rules and regulations for a VTS.
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To

ensure success of

the early systems,

deliberations with

maritime industry were extensive.
There was a distinct measure of political risk aversion
in the adoption of the original VTS location.

San Francisco

was chosen due to the relative simplicity of the harbor,
therefore adequate radar coverage could be achieved with the
minimum amount of equipment.

Additionally, a pilot operated

Marine Exchange provided a service similar to VTS, so the
port was familiar with the concept.

The Coast Guard District

Commander interfaced with all aspects of marine industry to
solicit their views and implemented their ideas in the design
[Ref.

76].

The Coast Guard's careful site selection and

involvement of users guaranteed successful implementation.
Puget Sound was chosen for the second VTS installation
ostensibly due

to predicted increases in tanker

traffic

caused by the Alaskan pipeline and to be able to interface
with the British Columbia VTS.

Extensive upgrades to the

system in 1976, despite being fourteenth out of twenty-two in
the VTS Analysis of Port Needs, indicate the decision may
have been politically motivated.

The deep water port is not

very difficult to navigate and the state of Washington has
exhibited

a

strong

commitment
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to

marine

safety

and

environmental

sancti t y7.

Therefore,

Coast Guard VTS

investment selection was planned to achieve success.

Re-

investment in the upgrades is suspect due to the relative
safety accounted for in the VTS Analysis of Port Needs.

This

may be attributed partly to a political need to demonstrate
high performance ability of an installed VTS in the wake of
the GAO critique and partly to the fact that the Chairman of
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation,
a staunch supporter of the PWSA and the Coast Guard,

was

Warren G. Magneson of Washington.
Analysis of extensive Congressional hearings [Ref. 78]
[Ref.

79]

on

the

topic

of

VTS

uncovers

substantial

differences in support for the concept directly attributable
to the degree of consultation the Coast Guard conducted with
local consti tuents.
An ideal system design technique was utilized in the
formation of VTS New York,

where a

formal

VTS Advisory

Committee was formed consisting of a Coast Guard and local
marine industry, per the tenants of the Federal Advisory

7A Washington state law enacted in 1975 (Substitute House
Bill No. 527, Ch. 125, 44th Sess., 1975) called for, in
part, that tankers in excess of 125,000 DWT be prevented
from proceeding up the channel beyond a certain point and
that tankers between 40,000 DWT and 125,000 DWT must have
(a) shaft horsepower in ratio of one for each two and
one-half DWTi (b) twin sc r e ws r (c) double bo t t om s r and
(d) two radars. The law eventually declared void by the
Supreme Court [Ref. 77] illustrates Washington's desire
to protect her estuary.
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Comm i ttee Act of January 1,
was

expressed

there

1972.

appeared

While some minor dissent

to

be,

overall,

complete

communication and common agreement between the regulators and
the users.

Involving the users in the design process

produced a design which was supported by all parties 8•
The above design was in marked contrast with that pursued
in establishing

the New Orleans VTS.

testimony featured dissatisfaction,

The Congressional

indictments of cover-ups

of unnecessary expenditures [Ref. 81] and heated debate.

All

previous VTS design

initiatives had utilized advisory

committees,

administration attempts to limit this

however,

proliferation

throughout

the

Federal

structure

in

1974

resulted in regulations which made committees more difficult
to establish [Ref. 82].
did

not

require

a

The Coast Guard determined the PWSA

committee,

only consultation,

and a

District request for an advisory group was denied [Ref. 83].
The

results

comparison

of

of
the

this denial

can

participation

be observed
rates

in

a

between

8 Th e New York VTS was never fully established.
The
design, owing to the harbor configuration and traffic
density, was complex.
Statement of work and design
inadequacies made the extensively computer aided system
incapable of handling vessel loading in a real time
fashion.
System bugs and inconsistent performance
debilitated the design and the contract was terminated
for the convenience of the government [Ref. 80]. New
York VTS operations were suspended in March, 1982,
demonstrating that agreement, while vital, does not
necessarily achieve a capable final product.
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Houston/Galveston VTS and New Orleans VTS.

Houston/Galveston

VTS has shown a voluntary participation rate in excess of
ninety-five percent for the entire system [Ref. 84], whereas,
New

Orleans

VTS

participation

statistics

indicate

a

participation rate as low as fifty-five percent [Ref. 85].
This figure demonstrates the significan t implementation
problems of the New Orleans VTS.

These problems can best be

described in an excerpt from a "Fair Play" editorial entitled
"You do it MY way":
"Interested persons are invited to particpate in this
proposed rulemaking by submitting written views, data or
arguments. Each person submitting a comment should include
his or her name and address and give reasons for each
comment. All comments received before the expiration of
the comment period will be considered before final action
is taken on this proposal.
It is important that all
interests be encouraged to submit their comments.
Besides
giving those affected by proposed rulemaking the impression
that they are in some way participating, the large
quantities of paper thus generated enable the department,
after suitable shredding, to considerably econmize on its
winter fuel bills" [Ref. 86].
Incidents such as described

in Appendix E presented

before a national symposium on piloting and VTS [Ref. 87] do
little to engender faith in the VTS concept.
the Road

[Ref.

88]

clearly provide

that a

The Rules of
smaller more

maneuverable vessel will not hamper a vessel in a channel
constrained by her draft, yet the Coast Guard proved impotent
and unable to enforce the regulations in a space they
controlled.

The inability of the Coast Guard to manage the
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harbor space, can only eventually result in tragedy, followed
by strict regulations.
Following Congressional hearings in 1975-1976

[Ref.

89]

[Ref. 90], which painted the Coast Guard in an unfavorable
light the agency originated a series of articles in trade
journals to elicit support for VTS.
tactics:

The campaign pursued two

one, an appeal to the business community and two, a

solicitation for maritime industry support. A "Business Week"
article

[Ref.

91] appealed to national pride, stating we had

gotten a late start but "have developed the most modern
equipment".

In

"Marine

Engineering/Log"

[Ref.

92]

the

reliability and accuracy of the system was described and the
potential benefits to users were detailed.
Continued intense interface with the maritime community
is required of

the Coast Guard to persuade users of the

benefits, difficult to ascertain from the soft database.
Specifically,

the following areas which result in

friction must be mutually understood by both the Coast Guard
and the maritime community and measures enacted to mitigate
the effects.
The mariners fear of VTS as a controller must be allayed.
The word control has ominous overtones to the tradition of
the independent mariner.
the

usurption of

his

The word suggests to the mariner

responsibility

and

freedom

to act

independently to manuever his vessel according to his own
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training and judgment,

with no reduction in accountability.

This anxiety translates to VTS being viewed as a "spying
network for the Captain of the Port" [Ref.93].

There is a

feeling that a statement such as:
"It must be clearly understood that the responsibility for
the safety of any vessel and its crew remains with the
Captain or Master and cannot and will not be assumed by the
VTS" [Ref. 94]
is meant to be a disclaimer of liability

[Ref.

95] vice

assurance that the Coast Guard has no designs on the
traditional authority structure.

Pilot job security and the

questioning of his qualifications are subsets of his loss of
control.

There is still no clear understanding of VTS as a

service and adjuct to a pilot permitting him to perform his
job in a more capable manner.
A second issue

is

received from a VTC.
sys tern s

wi thou t

the unreliable nature of the data
This criticism

is directed toward

surve i llance techniques,

str ictly VMRS.

Industry has demonstrated that the value of information based
on reporting and dead reckoning by computer is,
inaccurate and worst, extremely dangerous.

at best

There is no check

for non-participating ships, vessels with radio-failure or
non-towing vessels below 65 feet, all will be unknown to the
computer but capable of inflicting serious collision damage.
Inaccurate reports of speed and varying currents can produce
wide tolerances in where ships will meet, unapprehended by
the VTC.

In a harbor or waterway with any volume VMRS will
77

not work, and produces great
information.

risks for those who rely on the

It is interesting to note VRMS is the system

recommended by GAO.

The added communications burden to

ensure the dead reckoned trace is updated, further reduce the
pilots ability to perform his job.

The output given ships

does not justify the input, there is little assistance for
piloting.

The

Congressional

removal

of

funds

for

surveillance equipment for New Orleans VTS makes it the only
major system operating in strictly a VMRS mode.
Finally,

the

issue of

training of VTS operators has

caused consternation to mar i time trades.
by Coast Guard officers and men

who

The VTS is manned
receive on-the-job

training and are subject to frequent transfers.

While there

should be no requirement for the watchstander to be a pilot,
air controllers are not,

industry feels the training

is

inadequate.
The

so Lu-t Lon s

to

the

above

conf idence

and

operator

problems can be solved by more closely involving pilots in
the operations of VTC.

The expense of making VTC operators

civil servants may be overriding, but having a VTC operator
as a military career specialities is possible 9•
pilot

as

a

coordinator

of

training

would

Employing a
increase

the

9Recent overtures by the Coast Guard to designate the
billets as career specialties resulted in adverse
reactions from the VTC operators [Ref. 96].
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awareness of the Coast Guard operator and the confidence of
the mariner. Requiring a manning rotation which would have a
pi lot supervi se a VTS wa t c h ,

would off er a

tr ansfer of

expertise and achieve basic, but vital communication between
ship and shore. Apprentice pilots should be required to stand
a significant number of watches in the local VTC, prior to
gaining journeyman status.

Further, pilots should be

required to file a passage report and negotiate their
movement plan with the VTC, and follow the plan as far as
reasonable,

once it is approved

[Ref.

97].

Pilots thus

becoming field agents of VTS, could aid in the enforcement of
regulations, reporting ships who violate mandatory traffic
separation

schemes

or

refuse

to move

ships

they

found

improperly manned or equipped [Ref. 98].
Training of the VTS staff and complete involvement of the
user organizations is a

requisite

to safe,

efficient

operations.
The PWSA was ammended on 17 OCtober 1978 as the Port and
Tanker Satety Act in the wake of tanker disasters l O•

The new

10The Argo Merchant ran aground and sank off Cape Cod on
15 December 1977.
Although small (27,000 tons), the
threat to Georges Bank fishing grounds produced sensation
[Ref. 99]. Two days later, the Sansinena (Torrey Canyon
sister ship) exploded in Los Angeles Harbor killing nine
persons.
Other significant December accidents included:
Oswego Peace, December 247 Olympic Games, December 277
and Grand Zenith, December 29.
In total fifteen
casualties occurred between 15 December 1977 to 27 March
1978. The Amoco Cadiz disaster on 10 March 1978 is, to
date, the worst tanker accident.
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act renewed Congressional intent to utilize VTS as a method
to reduce the hazards in ports and waterways and that section
is substantially unchanged.
important

that

the

For reasons of efficiency, it is

Coast

Guard

and

marine

industry

collaborate to optimize VTS and not let a disaster cause
Congress to legislate improved user/regulator interface.
Among

the

improvemen ts

required

to

increase

mar ine

industry's will ing ness to i nve st in VTS is an improved da ta
base to quantify proofs, and to entice the involvement of the
insurance industry.

If actuary rationale can be found for

VTS and mar ine industry offered reduced prem i urns,
participation would be assured.
participation is insufficient,

their

To ensure complete success,
what is required is full

involvement and committment to the goals, demonstrated, by
continued dialogue and suggestions for improvement.
There

has

been

recent

evidence

of

community's recognition of the value of VTS.

the

maritime

Department of

Transportation budget cuts for 1982 prompted the announcement
by the Coast Guard to close San Franc isco and New Or leans VTS
in March of this year.
The Coalition To Save VTS was formed in San Francisco,
comprised of both United States and foreign flag operators
trading

regularly

in

the

Bay

area.

The Coalition began

levying a $125 fee on all vessels arriving in San Francisco
Bay,

receiving a high compliance ratio

80

[Ref.

100].

The

Coalition petitioned the Secretary of Transportation and
Congress to continue the service, demonstrating a willingness
to pay

their

fair

share and

effective.

suggested ways to make the

operation

more

The

funds

were

restored

by

Congress.

The Coast Guard and the Coalition are currently in

negotiations to determine apportionment.
New Orleans VTS was closed on 15 March 1982.

After a

brief shutdown, the industry, in the area which voiced the
most

opposition

to

VTS,

began

petitioning

appropriate funds for the VTS's operation.

Congress

to

The Coast Guard

received funds but had already transferred a large percentge
of

personneL

New

Orleans

VTS

September 1982.
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resumed

operation

on

1

IV.

CONCLUSIONS

The most pressing requirement in organizing a productive
VTS, from the vantage of both hazard reduction and expediting
traffic,

is the expansion and enrichment of the accident and

transportation

data

bases.

A uniform,

automated

data

collection system should be established which would extract
relevant data from the individual VTS files.

The Coast Guard

should interface with the Corp of Engineers to determine if
transit data can be refined and expanded to better identify
traffic density.

The collection of accident statistics needs

to be improved so underlying causes can be discovered, in
order to revise bridge structure and equipment and how VTS
will interface with the pilot or master.

The necessity for

an automated data base which require casualty and transit
statistics will probably necessitate a complete overhaul of
MCVR and transit files.
With the foundation of an accurate data base concerning
traffic and casualties,

the use of simulation models should

be expanded and validated.

The beauty of relevant simulation

is that benefits can be quantified' more precisely.

The

percent reduction in accidents of a certain type can be
determined

by applying

the model

management scheme is imposed.

before and after

a

The product of that reduction

and the dollars the accidents will cost, as determined from
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the algorithm, will give dollars saved.

Additionally, the

effects of increased port loading on the management system
can be easily determined.

From this data you can calculate

the marginal investment return to be realized from system
upgrade or re-design.

The large amount of data that can be

generated to specific dimensions can answer the difficult
question:

If routing measures, designed to reduce collision,

by drawing vessels closer to one another, in fact increase
the risk of accident?

The inherent problem is that the

results obtained would be no better than the validity of the
assumptions

made

regarding

the

accident and

traffic

projections.
Research efforts on VTS,
improvements,

in addition to data base

should focus on establishing international

requirements for

shipboard transponders.

The technological

and cost tradeoff must be examined to arrive at the optimum
mix.

The equipment must possess the ability to utilize data

link communication to avoid voice communication problems,
accomplish

specific

identification and

permit

accurate

location. This must be an international effort through IMeo
to avoid the navigation equipment problems that have occurred
in the past:

where the governing body for

Straits required a Decca
Navigation
board

equipment~

demanded

Navigation~

the Malacca

Japan demanded Satelite

while a joint Arabian Gulf navigation

compulsory

Omega~
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and Western

European

countries and America desire still another navigation suite.
Similar examples can be sited where ships which travel world
wide require seven different sewage disposal systems
[Ref.

101].

Unilateralism in establishing the requirements

of this inexpensive,

yet highly effective surveillance aid,

must be avoided to promote international cooperation and
prevent the proliferation described above.
If our ports are to effectively compete with those of
Canada and Mexico, regional port councils must be formed to
focus investment dollars on those ports and projects which
promise the highest return.

Only by overcoming the parochial

attitudes which dominate the port associations today, will
ports emerge with the necessary capital and concentrated
lobbying

power

to

permit

intelligent,

accelerated

development.
The

efforts of

the

clearly allocatable

Reagan administration

user

fees

from

to recoup

dredging

and

VTS

operations, has served to coalesce the port lobby, so they
can be adequately represented during the negotiations which
will determine their continued existence [Ref. 102].

While

some of the larger natural harbors have rejected the
symbiotic regional partnership,

pressure from the maritime

trades have caused their concession [Ref. 103].

The ability

of that lobby to secure fast-track legislation for dredging
and marshall funds for port infrastructure and VTS upgrading
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will determine their effectiveness.

The current proposals

concerning user fees for dredging will establish the pattern,
the Coast Guard will follow to decentralize their operation
of VTS.

The Coast Guard, however, must at the same time,

intensify research efforts.
The time period following the GAO criticism of the Coast
Guard has generally found the agency following the mandates
of the Port and Tanker Safety Act but in a methodical
fashion, with no real enthusiasm.
been plodding.

The evolution of VTS has

Initially the Coast Guard sought its new

mission with zeal, evaluating the new authorization as an
extension of their traditions,

to make the waterfront safer.

The Coast Guard generally regarded favorably,

for no one

could argue with or denigrate their lifesaving mission, have
been embroiled in a much more complex issue which involved
tradeoffs

not

previously

experienced.

The

age

of

environmental awareness has placed the Coast Guard between
warring factions polarized in their beliefs.

While the

determinations made can be argued, the necessity of a referee
to judicate and arrive at the correct decisions for waterways
which are both environmentally and economically sound is
indisputable.
The Coast Guard's role as a regulator of waterway and
shipping standards can only be maximized through exacting
well-defined research,

and intelligent compromise,
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based on

the analysis.

The analysis accurate and complete,

the Coast

Guard must be willing to persevere, responding to disapproval
wi th incisive,

sensible observations.

The pOlitical acumen

of the Coast Guard has been whet over the past ten years in
the transition from predominately a service agency to one
heavily involved in regulatory tasks.
The Coast Guard requires political support of powerful
regional,

environmental and maritime lobbies to compete for

scarce Federal funds.

With these funds they can continue and

enhance the research to reduce costly shipping accidents.
Too many narrow seas and saturated harbors exist to avoid
the concept of VTS.
remains,

the

Though some local, isolated resistance

world

trend

toward

intelligent

traffic

management and successful implementation in this country have
demonstrated the profits of improved waterway safety.
Coast Guard must zealously promote VTS,

The

while allaying fears

that they might exercise total control.

While VTS is not a

panacea,

r o Le : in

it must perform

an

reduction.
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integral

accident
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APPENIHX B

Mishap Investigation Report (OPNAV 3752/1)
OI'NAVINST 3750.6M
27 (kcober 1980
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APPENDIX C
Criteria for VTS Prevention Level Selection
1.

Vessel Bridge-to-Bridge Radiotelephone (LO)
Vessel collisions in waters where maneuvering room was
available, and in which at least one of the vessels
had prior knowledge of the other's presence.

2.

Regulations (L R)
Bridge rammings caused by excessive tow lengths or
under powered tugs.
Bridge ramming due to a lack of coordination.

3.

Traffic Separation Schemes (TSS)

(Ll)

Vessel collisions that occurred in waters which had
sufficient width and depth ammenable to a TSS and low
to medium traffic density.
4.

Vessel Movement Reporting System (VMRS)

(L2)

Accidents occurring as a result of two vessels meeting
in especially critical and crowded restricted waters
without advance knowledge of each other.
Accident caused

by an apparent lack of

traffic

coordination where advance knowledge of movements will
allow for queuing.
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Accidents caused by the lack of coordination between
vessels

in

vicinity

of

barge

fleeting

areas

and

vessels in other critical areas.
Accidents involving dangerous or hazardous material
where priority movement might be considered.
5.

Basic Surveillance (L3)
It is difficult to determine whether surveillance
would be necessary to prevent a particular accident.
Applied in areas where the accident potential was so
great that only a minimum error can be tolerated.
Critical intersections and

bends particularly in

restricted waters.
Collisions

between a

vessel

underway and one

anchored.
6.

Advanced Surveillance and Automated Advanced Surveillance
(L4 L5)'

In extremely hazardous and congested ports.
level of

Where the

traffic density is high and the

traffic

patterns are diverse and complicated. Where it is
thought a computerized queuing system would ease
congestion and reduce delays.
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APPENDIX D
Accident Prevention Determination Sheet
Accident Prevention Determlnatlons
elise #

._.__.

...

._____

D Prever-table

I.' Unpreventable

If tr£>ffic pane rna or congnstinn in th" 8rt'a ar.:: such that LiO)(B to Bl would not prevent the accident, what
&iSsistance is required from 8 SOurce external to the ship to prevent the accident.

1. Reduce ernoont or comploxity of intorrne tion processioq ItlQuired.

LJ

8.

reduce the number of ships in the area -- L(2)

C' b. reduce the uncertainty about other ships' poslticns - U2)

2. Give the vessel mare time for information processing.

o a.
o b.

warn of other shipping-l(2l
reduce speeds, increase clearanc8s-Ll2l

8 c. environrnental edvisories - L(2\

o

d. advance warning of critical or hazardous areas-Ll21

3. Give vessel more or bettor information.

o

a. other ships' position-L(2l

C b. knowledgf of other ships' Intentions - L(2l

C c.

position filllno-1l31

C d. central collection and broadcast of traffic dat8-L(21
L e warning of shtp standing into danger - L(3)
(only the lowest level which will produce the desired result is shown; levels are refined after considering
data elements 4-61

4. Traffic congestion

6. Traffic patterns

6.

Accident congestion

o Hi (judgen .ent from 8 look at transits and use
o Lo of local knowledge)
o Complicated (judgement from a look. at physical
o Simple
characteristics of area)
o Hi (from a plot of all accidents)
o Low

7. Fina: lave: selected

_
Brief Narrative of
Accident

Diagram of Accident
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APPENDIX E

VTS Incident
The following incident happened on August 17,

1979,

just

a couple of weeks ago.
It was a beautiful day and the blue fish were running in
New York.

Naturally, everybody that had a boat was out there

fishing for blues. Of course, the blue fish,

being smart,

were staying between the red and the black buoys in the
channel.
There were at least 150 boats in the area. There also was
a ship called the EXXON NEWARK heading into New York, and I
was on the 50,000 ton HESS VOYAGER about half a mile behind.
Now, as the EXXON NEWARK's pilot came into Ambrose Channel,
he could see that there wasn't a spot w ide enough for even a
small boat to pass through the fleet of fishing boats.

He

called me on the radio and said, "Jim, you better hold back
because I have all these idiots up ahead of me."

I said that

I could see the problem and I slowed down.
He did what should be done.

He called the Coast Guard

and asked them if they could give him some assistance. He
pointed out that there were at least a

100 boats in the

Channel and that all of them were stationary.
danger signal.

He blew the

At that time, we were to make vessel traffic

reports on channel 12.

But, the young man on 12 said that
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they had no control of the boats in our way to go back to
channel 13.

In the meantime, both of our ships were moving

up the channel.
The pilot of the EXXON NEWARK called on channel 13, and,
after a lot of discussion,

finally spoke to a Lieutenant

Commander who said, "Are those boats in your way?"
that the

boats

were

in

the

way,

he asked

if

When told
they

were

commercial or party boats and if the names of the boats in
the way could be transmitted.
The pilot responded that he could not get the names of
the boats, it was all he could do to handle his vessel.

The

Lieutenant Commander said that he would be back on the air
shortly.

After a long time, he did come back to say, "I am

very sorry to tell you that there is nothing we can do for
you at this

time.

But,

if you get

the names of

the

fishermen, we can go after them."
At this point, the Captain of the EXXON NEWARK got on the
radio, "I am the master of the EXXON NEWARK and I am going to
make this a formal protest."

I cut in and said, "I will join

in the protest," as did the captain of the HESS VOYAGER.
also suggested that they start a tape rolling.

He

Of course, we

don't know whether or not the transmissions were taped.
In the meantime, we both are changing course, changing
course again and slowing down.
Two big tankers are both backing and filling so that Mr.
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Jones can get his fish.

So, we went back to Big Brother.

We

both called the Coast Guard again and asked that they please
do something about the situation.

They said that if we could

get the names of any of the fishing boats they would go
after them. They also said that they couldn't do anything
about boats we couldn't identify.
I

went on the air to say that I was a member of the

Advisory Committee of the New York Traffic Service.

I asked

to be informed about who I could talk to about this type of
situation.

I had a sense of responsibility because I had

been trying to sell the vessel traffic service system to
everyone. I felt that it was a great thingi

just what we

needed.
Yet, all of a sudden, we were finding out that, even if
we get a vessel traffic service system, we cannot control
party boats.

In the New york area, I estimated that there

are about 733 million boats operated by people who know
nothing about the rules of the road but know a great deal
about the price of boats.
I wonder if the Coast Guard's vessel traffic service
systems will only be able to control the party boats and the
tankers, but not the little motor boats?

I think that is a

question that is very important to all of the pilots in the
United States.
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